ABSTRACT This paper presents the proposal of a new implicit and explicit certificate-based signature scheme (IE-CBS-kCAA scheme) using Sakai-Kasahara's type keys. The scheme security depends on the computational difficulty of solving the modified collusion attack algorithm with k traitors (k-mCAA problem), reducible in particular cases to the known k-CAA problem. The originality of the scheme consists not only in the formulation and application of a new difficult computational problem but also in its design to meet the paradigm of public key cryptography based on implicit and explicit certificates. Due to such an approach, the proposed signature scheme can be used in the traditional public key infrastructure with the revocation of explicit certificates and in non-standard infrastructures without the revocation of implicit certificates. In this paper, the security model is formulated and it is shown that the IE-CBS-kCAA signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen messages in the random oracle model. Moreover, it results from the comparison of the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme with other signature schemes based on implicit and/or explicit certificates that its computational efficiency is at a similar level. Computational tests have also shown that the scheme can be used in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of the Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors is simple. Let us assume that any group of users is given, who thanks to the knowledge of individual secrets, can use a particular service, e.g. pay-per-view television, creation of a digital signature, or message encryption. The security mechanisms of the service are built in such a way that any user belonging to an authorized set of users can use the service. Moreover, it must be ensured that even when all unauthorized users cooperate with each other, it would still be impossible to use the service illegally. It is obvious that two different situations are possible. In the first, trivial case, unauthorized users may receive a secret from one or more authorized users, referred to as traitors. They can use it until the service provider detects the fraud. In the second case, unauthorized users may try to create a new secret based on received or captured secrets (assigned to any unauthorized user) that can be considered by authorized users as the proper one, and will result in qualifying the fraudster as a valid member of an authorized users' group. The latter situation is particularly dangerous when the generated secret (private key) can be used to create a digital signature or in secret text decryption operations.
Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors (the k-CAA problem) was formulated in 2002 by Mitsunari et al. [2] . This problem and its later variants [3] belong to the group of computationally difficult problems. This is because if a group of traitors with a population of less than k users reveal their private keys, then it is computationally infeasible to recreate or generate another private key for a user from outside of this group. This type of properties of the k-CAA problem and its variants contributed to the fact that the problems of k traitors cooperation have become very useful in pairing based cryptography for the construction of new encryption or signature schemes (El Mrabet and Joye [4] ).
One of the first practical examples of using the k-CAA problem is the encryption scheme proposed in 2003 by Sakai and Kasahara [5] and simplified later by Zhang et al. [6] and Scott [7] . These schemes belong to the group of ID-based encryption (IBE) schemes, in which specific algorithms for generating private keys were used, guaranteeing that the schemes are afforded adaptive chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model, as long as an effective algorithm for solving the k-CAA problem does not exist. This mentioned keys generation feature is so characteristic that such schemes and other similar schemes are recognized as schemes based on Sakai-Kasahara key construction.
The Sakai-Kasahara key construction is also used in signature schemes. One of the first schemes of this type is the ID-based short signature scheme (ZSS), proposed in 2004 by Zhang et al. [6] . Hu et al. [8] demonstrated that the scheme is vulnerable to message-and-key replacement attacks. Nevertheless, this scheme is a basic element of many new signature schemes (e.g.: Barreto et al. [9] , Du and Wen [10] ) and, moreover, it allows simplifying proof of their security.
The main disadvantage of ID-based schemes is the inability to achieve in many cases Girault's level-3 security specifications [11] . This is due to the fact that the Trusted Authority (TA) knows the private keys of all users. What's worse, TA can restore any user's private key at any time. This property of ID-based schemes would be difficult to eliminate even when using hardware means of generating keys, e.g. smart cards with cryptoprocessors, and forwarding them to users later. The solution to this problem were supposed to be the certificateless signature schemes (CLS scheme), whose idea was proposed in the paper published by Al-Riyami and Paterson [12] .
One of the first certificateless signature schemes based on the k-CAA problem was the scheme proposed by Du and Wen [13] . However, in 2011, Fan et al. [14] and Choi et al. [15] independently showed that the scheme cannot be protected from Super Type I adversaries and hence does not allow Girault's level-3 security specifications to be achieved. The improved version of the Du and Wen scheme [13] , proposed by Fan et al. [14] , also does not allow to achieve this level of security. Examples of cryptanalysis of the signature scheme proposed by Fan et al. can be found in the works [16] - [18] . The Du-Wen's short CLS scheme is vulnerable to Type-I adversaries because this signature scheme is not randomized, i.e. multiple queries of the signature algorithm for the same message always generates a signature with the same value. This situation allows the adversary to easily obtain a partial private key used by the signer when signing.
Key replacement attacks are effective when applied to certain certificateless cryptosystems (Huang et al. [19] ) because no explicit authentication is required to obtain public keys. Of course, it is possible to construct a certificateless cryptosystem that defends against such attacks, but a less complex solution was proposed by Gentry [20] . This solution is primary used for encryption purposes and is referred to as certificate-based encryption, but it has been quickly generalized for use in certificate-based signature schemes (Kang et al. [21] , Li et al. [22] , Li et al. [23] , and Wu et al. [24] ). The solution proposed by Gentry does not automatically denote that all certificate-based schemes can resist key replacement attacks (e.g., in Li et al. [23] ).
Many of the certificate-based signature schemes designed in recent years are also based on the k-CAA problem or its variants. Two examples of such schemes are the proposals presented in the works of Liu et al. [25] and Li et al. [26] . Although the authors of both schemes declared that they are secure in the random oracle model, Cheng et al. [27] and Hung et al. [28] showed, respectively, that both schemes cannot protect against a Type I adversary that can obtain a partially private key of an uncertified targeted user.
The paper [29] proposes the encryption scheme IE-CBE belonging to the new category of public key cryptography schemes based on an implicit and explicit certificates. Schemes belonging to this schema category are confirmation of the observation [30] that the collision of ID-based, certificateless and certificate-based schemes with practice inevitably leads us to or at least close to the proven traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanisms. The IE-CBE scheme has been designed based on the k-CAA problem. To the best of our knowledge, there is no corresponding signature scheme based on both implicit and explicit certificates, as well as computational difficulty of the k-CAA problem or its variants. Hence, the problem of designing such secure signature schemes remains still a challenging open problem.
The above mentioned attacks on signature schemes occur for several reasons and especially because signature schemes are not randomized and are not properly secured against adversaries who can attempt to obtain full or partial user private keys.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
The present work is the full version of our paper. In comparison to the conference version [1] , it provides a full formal security proof, an extended introduction, the syntax of the scheme, the results of performance tests, and other additional information.
The basic result presented in the paper is the proposal of the first signature scheme based on implicit and explicit certificates using Sakai-Kasahara's key construction. Its security depends on the computational difficulty of solving k-mCAA problem, reducible in particular cases to the known k-CAA problem. The main property of the schema is that the public availability of the explicit certificate prevents the recovery of the implicit certificate. This feature of both certificates is of great practical importance and allows to verify the signature in the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme directly on the basis of an explicit certificate or indirectly on the basis of an implict certificate. In the first case, the verification can be ensured as for PKI certificates. In turn, in the second one the verification of the signature is performed similarly to the certificate-based signature schemes, without the need to refer to an explicit certificate.
The signature scheme IE-CBS-kCAA is an existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message and identity attacks (EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model. The sketch of proof presented in paper [1] indicates that the security problem of IE-CBS-kCAA scheme can be reduced to the computational difficulty of k-mCAA problem (the variant of the collusion at-tack algorithm with k-traitors) and discrete logarithm (DL) problem. In this full version of the paper, the complete proof of the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme security is presented. For the purposes of the proof, two games were defined, and then based on General Forking Lemma [39] , two wrappers and related reduction algorithms were developed allowing to solve the problems of k-mCAA and discrete logarithm. Such a possibility, however, openly contradicts the assumption of the difficulty of solving both problems, which shows that the proposed scheme is secure.
Finally, we show that although the proposed scheme does not belong to a short signature scheme category, it is computationally more efficient and has a similar signature length as other (implicit) certificate-based signature schemes described in [24] and [31] with a similar level of security.
B. PAPER ORGANISATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly review background information. Before presenting our results, we first present the syntax of the signature scheme based on implicit and explicit certificates (Section III) and our security model that protects against two different types of attacks (see Section IV). In Section V, the IE-CBS-kCAA randomized signature scheme from pairings is proposed, and its security proof in the random oracle is presented in Section V-C. The efficiency of our scheme is discussed in Section VI. Finally, we present the study's conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review the definition for groups equipped with an asymmetric bilinear map and precisely state hardness assumptions.
A. BILINEAR GROUPS
Here we briefly review the definition for groups equipped with an asymmetric bilinear map and precisely state the hardness assumptions.
Definition 1 (Asymmetric Bilinear Map Groups): Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of some prime order p > 2 k for some security parameter k ∈ N , and let G T be a multiplicative group. We say that (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) are asymmetric bilinear map groups when a bilinear map satisfies the following properties:
2) Non-degeneracy: for each P ∈ G 1 such that P = 1 G 1 , Q ∈ G 2 holds forê(P, Q) = 1 G 2 ; in other words, when P and Q are two generators of respectively G 1 and G 2 , thenê(P, Q) is a generator of G T ; 3) Computability: given (P, Q) ∈ G 1 × G 2 , an efficient algorithm for computingê(P, Q) exists; 4) An efficient and publicly computable (but not invertible) isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 such that ψ(Q) = P exists. Such bilinear map groups are instantiable with ordinary elliptic curves such as MNT curves [32] or with curves studied by Barreto and Naehrig [33] .
B. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we present mathematical problems used in this paper and define corresponding assumptions.
Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem [1] ): Given generator P ∈ G 1 and T ∈ G * 1 compute a ∈ Z * p such that T = aP. The DL is (t, ε) hard when the probability of any probabilistic t-polynomial-time algorithm A DL solving the DL problem in G 1 is defined as:
The DL assumption denotes the probability of Adv A DL being negligible for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A. Definition 3: (k-CAA problem, Mitsunari et al. [2] ). For a positive integer k and s ∈ Z * p , Q ∈ G 2 , given:
compute a new pair h * , 
The k-CAA problem is believed to be hard, i.e., no polynomial time algorithm can solve it with non-negligible probability. We define a new variant of the k-CAA problem hereinafter referred to as the k-mCAA problem (compare [2] ).
Definition 4: (k-mCAA problem [1] ). For randomly selected values s, r * , h * , r 1 , . . . , r k , h k ∈ Z * p , and Q ∈ G 2 , given:
compute a new pair h * , 1 r * h * +s Q . We say that the k-mCAA is (t, ε k−mCAA )-hard when for all t-time adversaries A k−mCAA , we have:
The k-mCAA assumption denotes the probability that Adv A k−mCAA is negligible for every probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm A. The k-mCAA is difficult to break because 50156 VOLUME 6, 2018 even when h * is known, the probability of finding a number x ∈ Z * p such that x = (s + r * h * ) −1 (mod p) with two unknowns s and r * is negligible and equal to (p(p − 1)) −1 .
Definition 4 is derived from the definition for the k-CAA3 problem, formulated by Islam and Biswas [34] . In contrast to the original definition, it is assumed that additional values r 1 Q, . . . , r k Q are input into the k-mCAA problem.
Let us assume that r * = 1 and r i = 1, (i = 1, . . . , k). Then the k-mCAA problem is transformed into a k-CAA problem. Thus, this k-CAA problem can be understood as a special case of the k-mCAA problem. Similarly, if r i = r * , (i = 1, . . . , k), then the k-mCAA problem is equivalent to the original k-CAA3 problem from [34] .
III. SYNTAX OF AN IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT CERTIFICATE-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME
The IE-CBS-kCAA scheme is defined by seven polynomialtime algorithms (compare also Wu et al. [24] , Chen and Cheng [3] , Zhang et al. [6] , and Hyla and Pejaś [31] ). With a security parameter 1 k , these algorithms function as follows:
Definition 5: (IE-CBS-kCAA scheme). An implicit and explicit certificate-based signature scheme includes the following seven polynomial-time algorithms: Remark: Algorithms Implicit-Cert-Gen and ExplicitCert-Gen end successfully when the TA positively verifies the identity and certificate information CI ID s related to a given identity. In addition, when a user requests a certificate of a public key Pk ID s , he must demonstrate to the certifier his possession of the corresponding Sk ID s , which can be performed in the same way that it is undertaken in the traditional PKI.
IV. SECURITY MODEL
In this paper, we consider only one type of security notion involving existential unforgeability (EUF) under a chosen-message attack (CMA) in the random oracle model (EUF-CMA). In this attack, an adversary who is allowed to ask the signer to sign any message of his choice adaptively according to previous answers, should not be able to generate a new valid message-signature pair.
A. ADVERSARIES AND ORACLES
The security model of the proposed IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, hereinafter referred to as EUF-IECBS-kCAA-CMA, is defined by two games played by the challenger C and adversary A assuming that the adversary chooses which game to play. In both cases, adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is trying to pass EUF-CMA security barriers of the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, i.e., the formal model describing existential unforgeability. To describe these games, we use the widely accepted two types of adversaries with different capabilities: the Type I Adversary and Type II Adversary (e.g., Hyla and Pejaś [31] ).
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The Type I Adversary (A 1 ) is able to compromise the user's secret key or replace the user's public key, but he is unable to acquire the TA's master secret key and the user's partial private key issued by the TA. We assume that adversary A 1 models the security against non-certified users and eavesdroppers, i.e., against users, who are not registered and who do not have certificates issued by the TA.
The Type II Adversary (A 2 ) can obtain the TA's master secret key and the user's implicit certificate, but he cannot compromise the user's secret key or replace her/his target public key. In this case it is reasonable to consider attack scenarios that target certified users, i.e., users who come into possession of a private/public key pair and of explicit certificates before the master key s is known to the adversary.
The formal security model of the implicit and explicit certificate-based signature schemes divides potential adversaries by level of attack power and classifies the Type I/II adversary into three types (see Li et al. [23] and Huang et al. [35] ): a Normal Adversary, Strong Adversary and Super Adversary. The adversaries are differentiated by the information they must have to obtain valid signatures. A Normal Type I/II Adversary must have the original public key, a Strong Type I/II Adversary must have a public key replaced by himself if he additionally submits the secret value corresponding to the replaced public key and a Super Type I/II Adversary must only have the replaced public key.
The most powerful attacks are made by the Super Type I/II Adversary, who may issue the following queries:
• Create-User-Query. This oracle takes as input query ID. When user identity ID has already been created, nothing is carried out by the oracle. Otherwise, challenger C runs algorithms Create-User used to obtain secret value s ID and public key Pk ID . Next, the oracle adds ID, s ID , Pk ID to the L U list, which is initially empty. In this case, the user with identity ID is said to be created. In both cases the oracle returns Pk ID .
• Public-Key-Replacement-Query. When ID is created, the oracle takes as input query (CI ID , Pk ID , Pk ID ), finds user ID in list L U and replaces original user's public key Pk ID with Pk ID . Otherwise, no action is taken. Note that the adversary is not required to provide secret value s ID .
• Corruption-Query. This oracle takes as input query ID. It browses list L U and when ID denotes the identity that has been created, the oracle outputs secret key s ID .
• Implicit-Cert-Gen-Query. With the input of identity index (CI ID , Pk ID ), this oracle returns implicit certificate Sk ID whenever a user with identity index (CI ID , Pk ID ) has been created. Otherwise, symbol ⊥ is returned.
• Explicit-Cert-Gen-Query. In this game, adversary A 2 may call the Public-KeyReplacement-Query oracle and obtain all secrets corresponding to identity indices other than (ID, Pk ID ).
The success probability of an adaptive chosen message and adversary A 2 with chosen identity index (ID, Pk ID ) wining the above game is defined as Adv
Definition 6: An implicit and explicit certificate signature scheme IE-CBS-kCAA offers existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-IECBS-kCAA-CMA) when no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary has a nonnegligible probability of winning Games I and II.
V. NEW IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT CERTIFICATE-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME IE-CBS-kCAA
The IE-CBS-kCAA scheme contains seven polynomial time algorithms: Setup, Create-User, Implicit-Cert-Gen, Explicit-Cert-Gen, Set-Private-Key, Sign and Verify. A detailed description of all algorithms of the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme is presented below: 1) Setup: the system parameters are params = {G 1 , G 2 ,
|G T | = p for some prime number p ≥ 2 k (k is the system security number), where (P, Q) are generators of respectively G 1 and G 2 such thatê(P, Q) = g, P 0 = sP and where Q 0 = sQ for system master public keys with master secret key s ∈ Z * p , H 1 , H 2 : × {0, 1} * → Z p are two secure cryptographic hash functions. × {0, 1} * is a string space that can be used to define a user with identity ID. In the cases discussed, when ID includes more information than the identity, we denote it as CI (Certificate Information 
then generates signature σ = (h, w 1 , w 2 , E) where:
Sk ID s (10)
while 
Hence,
Moreover, it is now easy to demonstrate the correctness of the explicit certificate:
B. IE-CBS-kCAA SCHEME MODIFICATION Any certificate-based signature scheme contains an implicit certificate that is a part of a user's private key. Hence, it seems natural to modify any particular signature scheme based on both explicit and implicit certificates and to reduce it to an implicit certificate-based signature scheme Assume that in our case we remove the Explicit-CertGen algorithm from the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme. The resulting scheme is a new scheme based on an implicit certificate (I-CBS-kCAA scheme in short). The introduced change requires one to remove certificate verification from algorithm Verify and to modify equation (13) as follows:
These changes simplify signature verification. Moreover, when users use a full version of the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, in some cases (when acceptable, e.g., in a closed trust zone), the signature verification can be performed as follows:
where q ID s is defined in (8).
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We prove the security of the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme by reducing the security level from higher-level construction to lowerlevel primitive. More precisely, we remove the adversary by breaking the protocol into an algorithm that can solve the respective k-mCAA or a discrete logarithm (DL) problem with non-negligible probability. In our reductions, we use the general forking lemma, proposed by Bellare and Neven [36] , similar to [31] . We briefly recall this using Lemma 1 (see also [37] and [38] ). Lemma 1 (General Forking Lemma [37] ): Fix integer γ ≥ 1 and set H of size |H | ≥ 2. Let B (Algorithm B is simply a wrapper that takes as explicit input answers to the random oracles) be a randomized algorithm that on input x, h 1 , . . . , h γ returns pair (J , σ ) where J ∈ {0, 1, . . . , γ } and σ are referred to as the side output. Let IG be a randomized algorithm refereed to as the input generator.
. . , h γ ) be the accepting probability of B. Forking game F B associated with B proceeds as follows:
Algorithm
At the end of Run 0, randomized algorithm B returns σ , the forgery produced by the adversary and J , and the index to the oracle query used by the adversary to forge. In Run 1 algorithm F B launches oracle replay attack by rewinding the input tape to the J -th oracle query and then rerunning adversary A using a different random oracle.
Lemma 2: Suppose that hash functions H 1 and H 2 are random oracles, and that in Game 1 against the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, adversary A 1 facts as an uncertified user. When Type-I adversary A 1 has a non-negligible advantage against 50160 VOLUME 6, 2018 our IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, then a reduction R 1 solves the k-mCAA problem over group G 2 with non-negligible probability:
where e denotes the base of the natural logarithm, where q E is the upper bound on the number of queries sent to the Implicit-Cert-Gen-Query oracle and where γ = q H 2 is the upper bound on the number of queries sent to the H 2 -Query oracle.
Proof: Similarly, to approach the case given in [31] , our reduction proceeds over two phases. First we describe intermediate algorithm B 1 (i.e., the wrapper) that interacts with adversary A 1 and returns a side output. Second, we show how to build reduction algorithm R 1 that launches general forking game F B 1 with wrapper B 1 . As a result, algorithm R 1 is obtained, which includes one pairing equation with one unknown and which returns the correct solution to the k-mCAA problem.
The Wrapper: Assume that the algorithm B 1 is given a random instance
The goal is to compute (r * q * + s) −1 Q for some q * / ∈ {q 1 , . . . , q k }, r * Q / ∈ {r 1 Q, . . .,r k Q}, and given q 1 , . . . ,
We show that Type I adversary A 1 can be converted to algorithm B 1 , which can solve a random instance of the k-mCAA problem (see Definition 4) . Assume also that γ = q H 2 and H = Z p . Wrapper B 1 takes as arguments a description of group (G 1 , G 2 , p, P, Q), a challenge (r 1 q 1 + s) −1 )Q, . . ., (r k q k + s) −1 )Q with a set of random elements q 1 , . . . , q k ∈ Z * p and h 1 , . . . , h γ ∈ Z * p , for which B 1 responds to the series of queries sent to the H 2 -Query hash oracle. It returns a triple (J , σ ) where J refers to indices of the target H 2 query and where σ is the side output. In addition, adversary A 1 always requests H 2 hash ofĥ = H 2 (m,ŵ 1 coin = 1 with a probability of ς and coin = 0 with a probability of 1 − ς (the value of ς will be optimized later); then: i) if coin = 0, it randomly selects a value q j ∈ {q 1 , . . . , q k } and sets c = q j , C = (r j c
. , r k Q}, then B I repeats step
A and otherwise calculates R ID i = c −1 (tP − P 0 ), C = t −1 Q, and Output: At the end of the game, a successful adversary outputs a valid forgery (m,σ = (ĥ,ŵ 1 
In this instance, Pk ID is chosen by A 1 and may not be the one returned by the oracle Create-User-Query. In addition, (ID, Pk ID ) and (m, CI ID , Pk ID ) have never appeared as Implicit-CertGen-Query, Explicit-Cert-Gen-Query or Super-Sign-Query queries, respectively.
Let CI ID , Pk ID ,R ,R , ctr i , coin,ĉ, ⊥, ⊥ and m,ŵ 1 P + hPk ID , U ,ĉ, ctr j ,ŵ 2 ,ĥ be the respective tuples of L H 1 and L H 2 that correspond to the target valid forgeryσ . Hence, wrapper B 1 returns (ctr j , coin,ĥ,ĉ, U ,Ê, Pk ID ,R ID ,R ID , Cert ID )) as its output.
Note that side-output σ consists of (coin,ĥ,ŵ 2 ,ĉ, U ,Ê, Pk ID ,R ID ,R ID , Cert ID ). If tuple (m,ŵ 1 P + hPk ID , U ,ĉ) has not been queried to random oracle H 2 -Query, B 1 will issue this query itself to ensure that tuples CI ID , Pk ID ,R ,R , ctr i , coin,ĉ, ⊥, ⊥ and m,ŵ 1 P + hPk ID , U ,ĉ, ctr j ,ŵ 2 ,ĥ are listed on respective lists L H 1 and L H 2 (here we use an approach similar to that used in [35] and [39] ).
Remark: When an adversary outputs an invalid forgery, B 1 outputs failure (denoted by E 2 ) and aborts.
End of Algorithm B 1 ( ) Reduction Algorithm R 1 : Now we can show how to build reduction algorithm R 1 that can exploit the general-forking algorithm associated with the above wrapper B 1 . Let = (G 2 , p, Q, sQ, (r 1 q 1 + s) −1 Q, . . . , (r k q k + s) −1 Q) be the given k-mCAA problem. Reduction algorithm R 1 invoke general-forking algorithm F B 1 to solve the k-mCAA problem. It runs F B 1 on challenge , with H 2 -Query involved in the replay attack. If F B 1 fails, R 1 aborts outputs failure (denoted by E 2 ) and stops. On the other hand, if F B 1 is successful, R 1 returns a set of two valid side-outputs as two unknowns and solves it Sk = (r * q * + s) −1 Q, where q * / ∈ {q 1 , . . . , q k } and r * Q / ∈ {r 1 Q, . . . , r k Q}. It can be verified that R 1 really returns the correct solution to the k-mCAA problem.
Correctness of the Solution to the k-mCAA Problem: If the multiple-forking algorithm F B 1 does not fail, R 1 obtains two sets of side-outputs σ 0 and σ 1 where
To measure this phenomenon, compare output σ from wrapper B 1 . Additionally, we assume thatÛ 0 =Û 1 ,β 0 =β 1 ,ĉ 0 =ĉ 1 , Pk =ŝ ID P, R =r Q P. R 1 outputs failure (denoted by E 4 ) and stops, ifβ is equal to 0.
Algorithm R 1 obtains two valid signature forgeriesσ i = (m,ĥ i ,ŵ 1,i ,ŵ 2,i ,Ê i , Pk,R ID ,R ID , Cert), (i = 0, 1) for the same messagem, public key Pk, explicit certificate Cert and (R ID ,R ID ). Based on two sets of side-outputs σ 0 and σ 1 the following equation is applied:
Cert,ĉR + Q 0 ĥ 1 (24) By making suitable arrangements, the equation (24) can be converted into the following form:
Finally, we obtain the solution to the k-mCAA problem (see Definition 4):
whereĉ / ∈ {q 1 , . . . , g k } andrQ / ∈ {r 1 Q, . . . , r k Q} Probability Analysis The probability that algorithm R 1 solves the k-mCAA problem remains to be computed. According to the simulation, algorithm R 1 can calculate value Sk when and only when the following events occur: ¬E 1 : B 1 does not fail during the simulation, ¬E 2 : A 1 outputs a valid forgery, ¬E 3 : F B 1 does not fail, ¬E 4 : R 1 does not fail, i.e., in interaction with adversary A 1 outputs two valid forgeries with a coin valueβ of 1.
We denote the probability at which F B is successful during the first run as acc 1 . As F B 1 is successful during the first run when no aborting occurs during the query phase (event E 1 does not occur) and as adversary A 1 produces a valid forgery (event E 2 does not occur), we have:
Event E 1 occurs only when A 1 makes an implicit certificate extract query using an identity with coin = 1 (see ImplicitCert-Gen-Query). Therefore,
In addition, the probability of adversary A 1 producing a valid forgery when event E 1 does not occur is equal to Pr[¬E 2 |¬E 1 ] = ε. Now, if events E 3 and E 4 do not occur, then the advantage of the algorithm R 1 in solving k-mCAA problem is:
Let gfrk be the probability at which F B 1 is successful. As event E 4 occurs when F B 1 fails, we have:
From the general-forking lemma (see Lemma 1) for γ = q H 2 and |H | = p, we have:
The probability that event E 4 does not occur, when event E 3 has not occurred, is the same as the probability at which coin valueβ of valid forgeries is not equal to 0. Thus:
Finally, derived from R 1 being successful in solving the k-mCAA problem can be calculated as follows:
Assuming that p >> 1, the above expression is maximized at ζ = 1/(1 + q E ). Therefore:
where e is the base of the natural logarithm. This ends the proof. Now, for Game 2 applied to the Super Type 2 adversary where the adversary models the certified entities, we demand that signers are honest and that their tuples (ID, Pk ID , Cert ID ) have been registered with the TA. For this assumption, the following lemma can be demonstrated using the random oracle model:
Lemma 3: Suppose that hash functions H 1 and H 2 are random oracles and that in Game 2 against the IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, adversary A 2 models the certified users. If Type-II adversary A 2 has a non-negligible advantage ε against our IE-CBS-kCAA scheme, then reduction R 2 solves the DL problem for group G 1 with non-negligible probability:
where e denotes the base of the natural logarithm where q R and q C denote the upper bound on the number of respective queries sent to Public-Key-Replacement-Query and Corruption-Query oracles where γ = q H 2 is the upper bound on the number of queries sent to the H 2 -Query oracle. VOLUME 6, 2018 Proof: As shown in algorithm R 1 (see Lemma 2), we first describe wrapper B 2 and then show how the reduction R 2 involves invoking the F B 2 algorithm on wrapper B 2 to solve the DL problem. Algorithm R 2 is given a random instance of the DL problem = (G 1 , p, P, αP) for αP ∈ Pk cert where Pk cert is a set of users' public keys Pk ID that were certified before the TA's master secret key was compromised.
The Wrapper: Suppose that γ = q H 2 and H = Z p . Wrapper B 2 takes as arguments as challenge P α = αP with α ∈ Z p and a set of random elements h 1 , . . . , h γ ∈ Z p . It returns a pair (J , σ ) where J refers to the target H 2 query and where σ is the side output. flips a biased coin that outputs value coin = 1 with a probability of ζ or coin = 0 with a probability of 1 − ζ (a value of ζ is optimized later), and then: i) if coin = 0, s ID ∈ R Z p is selected at random and public key Pk ID = s ID P is calculated; ii) otherwise, if coin = 1, value Pk ID ∈ PK cert is randomly selected; iii) Pk ID is returned to A 2 and tuple ID i , ⊥, Algorithm 
To measure this, compare output σ to wrapper B 2 . Additionally, we assume that (Û 0 = U 1 ∧β 0 =β 1 ) and Pk = αP. R 2 outputs failure (denoted by E 4 ) and stops ifβ is equal to 0.
Based on side outputs σ 0 and σ 1 , we can build a system of two congruences for unknowns α and k 1 :
From the above equations, α can be solved using the expression given below:
Note that equation (37) is precisely what we obtain as an output of algorithm R 2 .
Probability Analysis: According to the simulation, algorithm R 2 can calculate value α when and only when the following main events occur: 2 1 during the simulation of Corruption-Query; this occurs for probability (1 − ζ ) q C ; Therefore:
In addition, the probability that of adversary A 2 producing a valid forgery when events E 1 
Let gfrk be the probability with which F B 2 is successful. As event E 3 occurs when F B 2 fails, we have:
From the general-forking lemma (see Eq. (22)) for γ = q H 2 and |H | = p, we have:
The probability that event E 4 does not occur, when event E 3 has not occurred, is the same as the probability with which the coin valueβ of valid forgeries is not equal to 0. Thus:
Therefore, chance of R 2 being successful in solving the DL problem can be calculated as follows:
Assuming p >> 1, the above expression is maximized at ζ = 1/(1 + q R + q C ). Therefore: 
where e is the base of the natural logarithm. This ends the proof. VOLUME 6, 2018 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare IE-CBS-kCAA scheme to other existing schemes with similar constructions. Our comparison is based on results presented in [31] . Operations such as those involving: hashing, Z * p (inversion, addition, multiplication), multiplication with G T and addition with G 1 or G 2 are omitted from our efficiency comparison, as these are several orders of magnitude more efficient than pairings, scalar multiplications of G 1 or G 2 and exponentiations of G T . In Tables 1 and 2 , the proposed scheme is compared to other schemes (|G 1 | and |Z p | are the bit lengths of an element in G 1 and Z p , M G denotes scalar multiplication with G 1 or G 2 ,ê is a bilinear pairing on G 1 × G 1 and P GT denotes exponentiation in G T ). The proposed scheme offers the same level of security as WMSH Scheme II and the IE-CBHS scheme ( Table 3 ). The scheme involves employing a comparable number of timeintensive operations when compared to other schemes and is slightly more efficient than the IE-CBHS scheme.
The execution time of the Sign and Verification algorithms was tested using three test computers (1 -Intel Core i7 7700K@4,20 GHz, 32GB RAM; 2 -Intel Core i7 6500U@2,50 GHz, 12 GB RAM; and 3 -Intel Xeon W3520@2,67 GHz, 8GB RAM) using a single thread. The scheme was implemented using a MIRACL library [40] and Type 3 asymmetric pairing (ate pairing) (MIRACL library: MR_PAIRING_BLS k = 24 curve, AES-256 SECU-RITY). Time was measured using a C++ chrono library and results are presented as the average of five repetitions. Execution times required for the Sign and Verification algorithms (Table 4 ) are less than one second when using computers that are several years old; thus, the scheme is suitable for practical use.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
The use of the difficult computational k-CAA problem and its various variants to design new cryptographic schemes (including digital signature schemes) has been of interest to many researchers. Most of the proposed schemes have been compromised, which means that designing an encryption scheme based on the k-CAA problem or its variant is still an important research challenge.
The IE-CBS-kCAA signature scheme presented in the paper is resistant to the strongest attacks performed by Super Type I/II adversaries (Tab. III). Hence, the adversary following the rules of the game conducted with the challenger in the random oracle model is unable to create a valid signature for any message. It was shown in the paper that such a case is possible only if the challenger with the help of the adversary would be able to solve both the modified Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors (k-mCAA), as well as the discrete logarithm problem (DL).
In comparison to the analyzed signature schemes, the proposed scheme is also computationally effective (Tab. I and II). In particular, the generation of a signature is effective (Tab. IV), which results from the lack of necessity to calculate the value of a bilinear pairing. Computational experiments have also shown that the actual times of signature calculation and verification are acceptable to potential users.
The IE-CBS-kCAA signature scheme has interesting property giving users the opportunity to work with an explicit and implicit certificate or with an implicit one only (see: section V.B). We are convinced that this property can be used to extend the scheme by the possibility of effective revocation of the explicit certificate and the implicit one as well. In such a case, the explicit certificate will play the role of a long-term certificate, while the implicit certificate acts as a short-term certificate. This should allow for the solution of a significant practical problem of the validity of an explicit and/or implicit certificate at the time of signing (Baier and Karatsiolis [41] ). This problem occurs in traditional PKI infrastructures, but it also appears in non-standard infrastructures with many trusted authorities TA. The solution to this problem will be the subject of our further work.
